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Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff : A Final Requiem
for the Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain?*
Eminent domain, the power of the government to seize private
property,' is limited by the fifth amendment to the United States
Constitution which provides that "private property [shall not] be
taken for public use without just compensation." 2 The fifth amend-
ment's public use limitation does not substantially restrict the gov-
ernment's taking power, however, because both state and federal
* This note may be viewed as a postscript to a comment published in 1949 in the Yale
Law Journal entitled The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58
YALE L.J. 599. That comment began with the following observation:
Legal doctrines usually die quietly, if slowly. Their demise is generally
accompanied by no more than soft sighs of relief at the courts' final
acknowledgment of decay. But the theory of "public use" as a limitation on
eminent domain-the notion that there are only certain limited "public purposes"
for which private property may be expropriated-bulked so large in its prime and
has taken so long in dying that, at the risk of disturbing the death-watch, a few final
words may be in order.
Id. at 614. The author argued that the Supreme Court had repudiated the doctrine of pub-
lic use and then concluded that "the doctrine will continue to be evoked nostalgically in
dicta and may even be employed in rare atypical situations. Kinder hands, however, would
accord it the permanent interment in the digests that is so long overdue." Id.
The above thesis has been criticized because "it assumes the courts took the pure form
of the public use doctrine more seriously than they probably did." C. DONAHUE, T. KAUPER
& P. MARTIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROPERTY 1365 n.1 (1974). Nevertheless, the au-
thor's prospective arguments have proved correct and the case discussed herein only buries
the public use clause deeper under the weight ofjudicial authority.
1 The powers of the federal government are enumerated in the Constitution. No-
where does the Constitution grant the power to seize private property. Nevertheless, since
the late 19th century the Supreme Court has recognized the taking power of the federal
government. The Court has held that the eminent domain power is an attribute of national
sovereignty and a political necessity. See Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371-72 (1875).
See also Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553, 559-62 (1972).
Where the federal government exercises eminent domain on the grounds that it is "neces-
sary and proper" to carry out one of its enumerated powers, its legitimacy is strengthened.
Within the District of Columbia, Congress possesses general police powers and may claim
authority to seize private property just as states do within their territorial boundaries. See
District of Columbia v. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100, 108 (1953).
State governments claim the power of eminent domain either through the tenth
amendment, which grants to the states all powers (police powers) not expressly granted to
the federal government, or alternatively, as an attribute of sovereignty. The police power
and eminent domain power are closely related, but possess discrete characteristics. Under
its police power, a state may regulate behavior to promote the public health, safety, welfare,
or morals. Eminent domain allows the state to seize property for public use. While the
latter power may be viewed as one of the general police powers, or separately as an attri-
bute of sovereignty, any taking is subject to the same constitutional constraints. Since
1897, the public use and compensation requirements of the fifth amendment have applied
to the states through the fourteenth amendment. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v.
Chicago, 166 U.S. 227 (1897).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
legislatures have broadly interpreted that term, and courts have ac-
corded wide deference to legislative determinations.
3
In recent years, legislatures have shown increasing willingness
to exercise the power of eminent domain for uses which seem dis-
tinctly private.4 In Hawaii, for example, the state legislature created
a land condemnation scheme whereby title in real property is taken
from certain lessors and transferred to lessees. 5 This legislation
purportedly serves the public purpose of reducing the concentra-
tion of land ownership within the state.6 In Hawaii Housing Authority
v. Midkiff7 the United States Supreme Court upheld this legislation
as a "comprehensive and rational approach to correcting market
failure." 8
Notably, courts have not required that expropriated property
be used by the public; rather, they have upheld condemnations even
if made only for the public benefit or for public purposes. 9 This
broadened meaning of public use defies objective definition and no
attempt will be made here to define its parameters.' 0 Instead, this
note addresses a separate but related issue-the standard of review
appropriate to the public use aspect of eminent domain. The stan-
dard adopted will bear heavily on whether a legislative determina-
tion will be upheld. In Midkiff, the Supreme Court applied the
"rational basis test"" in analyzing the constitutionality of the Ha-
3 See notes 14-54 infra and accompanying text.
4 See, e.g., Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 304
N.W.2d 455 (1981) (per curiam) (discussed in text accompanying notes 87-97, 130-31 in-
fra). See also City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 646 P.2d 835, 183 Cal.
Rptr. 673 (1982). In Oakland Raiders, the California Supreme Court, holding that the
seizure of a football franchise could satisfy the public use requirement, reversed the lower
court's summary dismissal of the City's action. On remand, the lower court, after a full
evidentiary hearing, again dismissed the City's complaint. The California appeals court
subsequently overruled this decision as "contrary to the law of the case established in Oak-
land I." See City of Oakland v. Superior Court, 150 Cal. App. 3d 267, 197 Cal. Rptr. 729
(1983).
5 HAWAI REV. STAT. §§ 516-1 to -83 (1976 & Supp. 1982).
6 See note 15 infra and accompanying text.
7 104 S. Ct. 2321 (1984).
8 Id. at 2330; see notes 50-54 infra and accompanying text.
9 In Rindge County v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700 (1923), the Supreme
Court stated: "It is not essential that the entire community, nor even any considerable
portion,. . . directly enjoy or participate in any improvement in order [for it] to constitute
a public use." Id. at 707. In NMidkif, the Court stated that legislative attack on the concen-
tration of land ownership constituted a "legitimate public purpose." 104 S. Ct. at 2331.
10 Several scholars have attempted to define the parameters of the public use clause.
See Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 OR. L. REV. 203 (1978); Mei-
dinger, The Public Uses of Eminent Domain: History and Policy, II ENVTL. L. 1 (1980); Note,
State Constitutional Limitations on the Power of Eminent Domain, 77 HARV. L. REV. 717 (1964);
Note, Reexamining the Supreme Court's View of the Taking Clause, 58 TEx. L. REV. 1447 (1980);
Comment, The Public Use Limitation in Eminent Domain, 82 W. VA. L. REV. 357 (1979).
11 The Court noted that the Hawaii legislation was "rationally related to a conceivable
public purpose." 104 S. Ct. at 2329; see text accompanying notes 53-54 infra.
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waii Land Reform Act. This note examines, in light of Midkif, the
prevailing standard of review in eminent domain cases and dis-
cusses the appropriateness of applying that standard from both a
constitutional and public policy perspective.
I. Standard of Review in Eminent Domain Cases
The United States Supreme Court historically has not applied a
uniform standard of review in enforcing the fifth amendment's pub-
lic use limitation on eminent domain. The divergent decisions of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 12 and the
United States Supreme Court in their respective considerations of
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff reveal this lack of uniformity.' 3
In Midkiff, the trustees of a private estate challenged the consti-
tutionality of the Hawaii Land Reform Act of 1967 (the Act). 14 This
Act, promulgated to remedy the enduring concentration of land
ownership inherited from Hawaii's feudal past, 15 established a con-
demnation scheme designed to transfer land ownership to existing
lessees of property held by large estates.' 6 In its simplest form, the
Act authorized lessees living on single-family residential lots within
tracts of at least five acres to request that the Hawaii Housing Au-
thority (HHA) condemn the property which they leased.' 7 The
HHA, in turn, was authorized to hold a public hearing to determine
whether the requested condemnation would effectuate the public
purposes of the Act. 18 Upon a determination favorable to the
lessee, the HHA could acquire full title to the property by condem-
nation and then sell the property to the lessee.' 9
This Act was challenged on the ground that it violated the pub-
lic use clause of the fifth amendment. 20 The district court assented
to the Act's constitutionality2' but the Ninth Circuit reversed. 22 In
determining the appropriate standard of review to be applied to the
public use requirement, the court of appeals first discussed several
leading cases, 23 beginning with Old Dominion Land Co. v. United
12 Midkiffv. Tom, 702 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1983).
13 104 S. Ct. 2321 (1984).
14 HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 516-1 to 83 (1976 & Supp. 1982).
15 See Brief for Appellants at 1-4, Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. 2321
(1984).
16 HAWAH REV. STAT. §§ 516-1 to -30.
17 Id. at §§ 516-1 to -22.
18 Id. at § 516-22.
19 Id. at § 516-25.
20 483 F. Supp. 62, 64 (D. Hawaii 1979).
21 Id. at 70.
22 702 F.2d at 788.
23 See, e.g., Berman v. Parker 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Rindge County v. County of Los An-
geles, 262 U.S. 700 (1923); United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry., 160 U.S. 668 (1896).
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States,24 in which the Supreme Court deferred to legislative rulings
on the public use question. In Old Dominion, the United States, pur-
suant to wartime appropriation legislation, 25 seized land leases
from Old Dominion for military purposes. 26 The government later
attempted to acquire the property by purchase and, when that
failed, condemned the property.27 The Supreme Court, in lan-
guage that has been widely cited, stated that the decision of the
federal Congress "is entitled to deference until it is shown to in-
volve an impossibility." 28 Twenty years later, the Supreme Court
upheld Old Dominion in United States ex rel. Tennesee Valley Authority v.
Welch. 29 In that case, the United States seized land pursuant to the
Tennesee Valley Authority Act,3 0 which authorized the construc-
tion of a reservoir and power dam for war production. 31 Lands
near the dam were seized for the safe development of the project.3 2
The Court, in reviewing that taking, reiterated the language of Old
Dominion and stated that "[a]ny departure from this judicial re-
straint would result in courts deciding on what is and is not a gov-
ernmental function and in their invalidating legislation on the basis
of their view on that question at the moment of decision . . .,.
Apart from wartime condemnations, Berman v. Parker34 pro-
vides the strongest support for judicial deference to legislative de-
terminations of what constitutes public use for fifth amendment
purposes. In Berman, private property owners challenged the con-
stitutionality of the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act,3 5
which provided the framework for area urban renewal.3 6 Pursuant
to that Act, private property was condemned to effectuate proposed
redevelopment.3 7 In affirming the lower court's decision, the
Supreme Court held that the public use requirement was satisfied 38
and, in doing so, applied a standard of review that has been regu-
larly followed in both federal and state courts:
24 269 U.S. 55 (1925).
25 Act ofJuly 11, 1919, 41 Stat. 104; Act ofJuly 1, 1922, 42 Stat. 767.
26 269 U.S. at 63-66.
27 Id. at 63.
28 Id. at 66.
29 327 U.S. 546 (1946).
30 16 U.S.C.A. § 831 (1974 and West Supp. 1984).
31 327 U.S. at 548.
32 Id. at 550-51.
33 Id. at 552.
34 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
35 D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 5-701 to -719 (1951)
36 348 U.S. at 28-30.
37 The land seized was to be used for "housing, business, industry, recreation, educa-
tion, public buildings, public reservations, and other general categories of public and pri-
vate use of the land." Id. at 29.
38 Id. at 33.
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Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature
has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclu-
sive. In such cases the legislature, not the judiciary, is the main
guardian of the public needs to be served by social legislation,
whether it be Congress legislating concerning the District of Co-
lumbia . . . or the States legislating concerning local affairs
... . The role of the judiciary in determining whether that
power is being exercised for a public purpose is an extremely
narrow one.
3 9
The court of appeals in Midkif distinguished Old Dominion, Welch,
and Berman on the ground that these cases involved judicial review
of federal congressional determinations, rather than state
determinations.
4 0
The court of appeals noted that the Supreme Court had not
applied a deferential standard of review to state legislative determi-
nations of what constitutes public use. 41 In Cincinnati v. Vester, 42 for
example, the Court declared, "[it] is well established that in consid-
ering the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to cases of ex-
propriation of private property, the question what is a public use is
ultimately a judicial one."-43 The Midkiff court interpreted this lan-
guage not merely as restating the principle ofjudicial review estab-
lished in Marbury v. Madison,44 but as indicating that the court would
make an independent determination on the matter and decide the
question in accordance with its views of constitutional law.4 5 Such
an interpretation is justified in light of the Supreme Court's lan-
guage in two earlier cases46 decided in 1896, on which the Vester
Court relied.
While relying on the Vester line of cases to justify a heightened
39 348 U.S. at 32 (emphasis added).
40 11idkiffv. Tom, 702 F.2d at 797-98. "The cases cited by [the Hawaii Housing Author-
ity] ... involved the review of a Congressional determination that there was a public use, not
the review of a state legislative determination." Id. at 798 (emphasis added).
41 Id.
42 281 U.S. 439 (1930). This case involved the appropriation of land by the City of
Cincinnati to widen city streets.
43 Id. at 446.
44 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
45 The court of appeals stated that it "must properly make the ultimate determination
of whether the use is public." Midkiffv. Tom, 702 F.2d at 798.
46 In Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896), involving a state seizure
of land to form irrigation districts in arid lands, the Court stated:
We do not assume that [state legislative statements as to what constitutes public
use], together with the decisions of the state court [in other cases], are conclusive
and binding upon this court upon the question as to what is due process of law,
and, as incident thereto, what is a public use .... [W]e must decide [these ques-
tions] in accordance with our views of constitutional law.
Id. at 159-60. In Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896), the Court invalidated
a compensated taking of property, stating that "the taking by a State of the private property
of one person or corporation, without the owner's consent, for the private use of another
... is a violation . . .of the Constitution." Id. at 417.
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standard of review, the court of appeals also distinguished between
public use and public benefit.47 Determining that the Hawaii legisla-
tion involved the seizure of property for the private benefit of lease-
holders, the court stated that the Act involved "a naked attempt on
the part of the state of Hawaii to take the private property of A and
transfer it to B solely for B's private use and benefit." 48 The court
therefore held the Act facially unconstitutional.
49
The Supreme Court rejected the distinctions drawn by the
court of appeals 50 and upheld the Hawaii Land Reform Act as a
permissible exercise of the State's taking power. 51 Giving scant at-
tention to previous cases in which it had applied close scrutiny,
5 2
the Court stated that "where the exercise of the eminent domain
power is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, the Court has
never held a compensated taking to be proscribed by the Public Use
Clause." 53 The Court, affirming the application of a rational basis
test embodied in Berman, provided the following rationale for ac-
cording absolute deference to the legislature:
Judicial deference is required because, in our system of govern-
ment, legislatures are better able to assess what public purposes
should be advanced by an exercise of the taking power ....
Thus, if a legislature, state or federal, determines there are sub-
stantial reasons for an exercise of the taking power, courts must
defer to its determination that the taking will serve a public use.
54
This language suggests that courts are limited to a deferential stan-
dard of review regardless of the circumstances surrounding a par-
ticular seizure of property. Although the application of a deferential
standard does not dictate that all condemnations will be upheld, it
does provide a strong presumption of constitutionality.
II. Constitutional Analysis
The Supreme Court's decision in Midkiff is a reminder of the
fragile nature of our constitutional protections. The case raises im-
47 Midkiffv. Tom, 702 F.2d at 793-96.
48 Id. at 798.
49 Id.
50 The Court stated:
The mere fact that property taken outright, by eminent domain is transferred
in the first instance to private beneficiaries does not condemn that taking as having
only a private purpose ....
Similarly, the fact that a state legislature, and not the Congress, made the
public use determination does not mean that judicial deference is less appropriate.
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. at 2328-3 1.
51 Relying on Bennan, the Court maintained that a state's taking power is "coterminous
with the scope of a sovereign's police powers." Id. at 2329.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 2329-30 (emphasis added).
54 Id. at 2331 (emphasis added).
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portant questions regarding the role of the judiciary in interpreting
the Constitution and, more specifically, the propriety of employing
a deferential standard of review in eminent domain actions. In
resolving these questions, it is useful to focus on the analytical
foundation of Berman and Midkiff, namely, a "police power/due
process analysis."
55
The Supreme Court in Midkiff characterized government tak-
ings as "socioeconomic legislation" 56 which involved a "classic ex-
ercise of a State's police powers." 57 As in the substantive due
process context, legislation characterized in this manner will ordi-
narily survive constitutional attack.58 Moreover, once the taking
power is defined "coterminous[ly]" 59 with the police power, the
public use limitation on eminent domain becomes less compel-
ling.60 Yet, despite this characterization of government takings,
two factors suggest that judicial deference should not be mandated
in all condemnation cases. First, even within substantive due pro-
cess analysis, the Court will accord strict scrutiny where "funda-
mental rights" 6' are challenged. Second, as reflected in recent
contracts clause cases,62 the Court has indicated a concern for up-
holding specific constitutional guarantees against a state's police
power. A closer examination of substantive due process and con-
tracts clause analyses provides support for allowing judicial discre-
tion in determining the appropriate standard of review in eminent
domain cases.
A. Substantive Due Process and Fundamental Rights
In substantive due process cases, the Supreme Court will ordi-
narily uphold legislation which may be characterized as economic in
55 483 F. Supp. 62, 67 (D. Hawaii 1979). While both the district court and the Supreme
Court expressly adopted this analysis, it is likely that the Supreme Court's concern for
states' rights played a role in its decision.
56 104 S. Ct. at 2330.
57 Id.
58 See notes 63-75 infra and accompanying text.
59 See note 51 supra.
60 As the Court explained in Berman, the police power is broad and inclusive:
Public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and order-these
are some of the more conspicuous examples of the traditional application of the
police power to municipal affairs. Yet they merely illustrate the scope of the power
and do not delimit it. ...
The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as
monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the commu-
nity should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced
as well as carefully patrolled.
348 U.S. at 32-33.
61 See text accompanying note 81 infra.
62 See text accompanying notes 106-08 infra.
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nature,63 but will closely scrutinize legislation affecting "fundamen-
tal rights." 64 While condemnations are often viewed as economic
regulatory measures, the rights implicated by government seizure.
may also bear a proximate relation to those specific rights which
merit close scrutiny on review. 65 To the extent that the facts sur-
rounding a government taking confirm such a relation, courts
should accord heightened scrutiny to the public use requirement.
Judicial protection under substantive due process analysis has
fluctuated in a cyclical fashion throughout our constitutional his-
tory.66 In the early years of this century, the Court regularly em-
ployed substantive due process analysis in striking down state
regulations which impinged on individual liberty or property inter-
ests. 67 In Lochner v. New York, 68 for example, the Court struck down
a law which regulated the number of hours a baker could work.
The Court determined that such a regulation constituted an im-
proper exercise of the state police power. 69 In West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish,70 a 1937 decision, the Court signaled that it would no
longer use substantive due process doctrine to invalidate economic
regulation, but would defer to the legislature. 7' Since Parrish, the
Court has consistently upheld economic regulation against due
process attack if the regulation satisfies the "rational basis test"
(i.e., as long as it bears a rational relation to a constitutionally per-
missible legislative activity).72
The Court, however, has not surrendered its authority to strike
down legislation where specific constitutional guarantees are
threatened. Only one year after Parrish, in United States v. Carolene
Products Co. ,73 the Court reviewed federal legislation prohibiting the
interstate shipment of adulterated milk. 74 In upholding this eco-
nomic regulatory measure, the Court deferred to the legislature's
decision. 75 Justice Stone, however, writing for the majority, cau-
tioned that such deference might not be appropriate in all situa-
tions: "There may be a narrower scope for operation of the
presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its
63 SeeJ. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 443-51 (1983) [herein-
after cited as J. NOWAK].
64 See text accompanying note 81 infra.
65 See notes 84-100 infra and accompanying text.
66 SeeJ. NOWAK, supra note 63, at 425-51.
67 Id. at 436-43.
68 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
69 Id. at 64.
70 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
71 Id. at 398-400.
72 See J. NOWAK, supra note 63, at 444-45.
73 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
74 Id. at 145-46.
75 Id. at 154.
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face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as
those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally spe-
cific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth." 76 The
Court has since closely scrutinized legislation which potentially
jeopardizes certain express constitutional guarantees or other fun-
damental rights placed in question on substantive due process or
equal protection grounds.
77
The test to determine whether a specific provision of the Bill of
Rights merits scrutiny is not clear. One leading author provides the
following guideline:
When the Supreme Court holds a provision of the Bill of Rights
applicable to the States, it does so because thejustices are of the
opinion that it is a right which can be deemed "fundamental" to
the American system of government. Accordingly, the justices
will not tolerate either federal or state activities which impair the
right.
78
The fifth amendment's public use limitation is one provision of the
Bill of Rights which has been held to apply to the states. 79 Curi-
ously, however, this express provision now receives less judicial at-
tention than certain other implied fundamental rights such as the
right to interstate travel.80 What makes a right "fundamental" and
deserving of strict scrutiny is not clear, but the preeminent charac-
teristic of such rights is that they are deemed essential to the pres-
ervation of liberty.
8 1
By requiring that courts defer to legislative determinations of
what constitutes public use, 82 the Supreme Court has seemingly
characterized all takings as economic regulatory measures which do
not impinge on individual liberty interests.83 But this characteriza-
tion disregards the close relationship between private property
ownership and liberty.8 4 This relationship is easily recognized
when a person's home or lifetime business is condemned, purport-
76 Id. at 152 n.4.
77 Where a court employs "strict scrutiny," it will require that the legislation in ques-
tion promote a compelling governmental interest. See, e.g., Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67
(1976); Storer v, Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
78 J. NOWAK, supra note 63, at 457.
79 See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
80 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
81 SeeJ. NOWAK, supra note 63, at 418-19. Surely, private property may be essential to
the protection of liberty. For an early judicial acknowledgment of this, see Corfield v. Cory-
ell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
82 See text accompanying note 54 supra.
83 In characterizing takings as "socioeconomic legislation," the Court did not limit its
holding to the narrow set of facts in question. See Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 104
S. Ct. at 2330.
84 Professor Michelman has characterized property as an a "essential component of
individual competence in social and political life" and as "material foundation" for "self-
determination and self-expression." See Michelman, Mr. Justice Brennan: A Property Teacher's
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edly to benefit the public good. 85 Indeed, the Framers of the Con-
stitution understood the inseparable link between private property
and liberty when they imposed the public use limitation on eminent
domain.86 While it is not suggested that every government seizure
merits strict scrutiny, it is proposed that courts should be able to
exercise discretion, depending on the circumstances of each case,
in arriving at the appropriate standard of review.
A recent Michigan case, Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of
Detroit,8 7 illustrates the need for judicial flexibility in choosing the
appropriate standard of review. In Poletown, the City of Detroit con-
demned an area of land which General Motors desired for the site
of a new assembly plant.88 The condemned land, however, did not
consist of investment properties, but of a "tightly knit residential
enclave of first- and second-generation Americans, for many of
whom their home was their single most valuable and cherished as-
set ... ."89 The City defended the taking on the ground that it
would alleviate the bleak unemployment picture in the area. 90 The
Michigan Supreme Court, following Berman, deferred to the legisla-
ture, noting that the promotion of industry constituted a legitimate
public purpose. 9' This case probably involves the most eggregious
use, or abuse, of the taking power in recent history. 92 Yet, if courts
are limited to "rational basis" analysis, they have little choice but to
affirm such legislation.
Lawrence Tribe, in his brief on behalf of the Hawaii Housing
Authority in Midkif, acknowledged the Poletown taking as one which
Appreciation, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 296, 298-99, 304 (1980). See also Michelman, Prop-
erty as a Constitutional Right, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1097 (1981).
85 Property is most closely tied to liberty when that property may be classified, in the
words of Professor Radin, as "personal property." Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN.
L. REV. 957, 959 (1982).
86 See note 121 infra.
87 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981) (per curiam).
88 Id. at 646-60; 304 N.W.2d at 467-71 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
89 Id. at 658; 304 N.W.2d at 470 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
90 Id. at 630; 304 N.W.2d at 458; see text accompanying note 130 infra.
91 Id. at 634; 304 N.W.2d at 459. "The power of eminent domain is to be used in this
instance primarily to accomplish the essential public purposes of alleviating unemployment
and revitalizing the economic base of the community. The benefit to the private interest is
merely incidental." Id.
92 In dissent, Justice Ryan stated:
The reverberating clang of its economic, sociological, political and jurispru-
dential impact is likely to be heard and felt for generations. By its decision, the
Court has altered the law of eminent domain in this state in a most significant way
and, in my view, seriously jeopardized the security of all private property
ownership.
Id. 410 Mich. at 645; 304 N.W.2d at 464-65. For critical reviews of the Poletown decision,
see Note, Public Use in Eminent Domain: Are there Limits after Oakland Raiders and Poletown?,
20 CAL. W.L. REV. 82 (1983); Comment, Corporate Prerogative, "Public Use" and a People's
Plight. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 1982 DEr. C.L. REV. 907 (1982).
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involved more than a mere seizure of economic interests.93 Tribe,
however, referred to the case in discussing the fifth amendment's
just compensation clause, not its public use provision:
If this Court should ever decide that the Constitution's
promise of just compensation insufficiently protects some par-
ticular category of property, . . . such a decision could surely
occur only in a context where no amount of money could "com-
pensate" for the special harm government was doing-where
government was expropriating not an impersonal and fungible
economic investment, but a person's home or place of worship
or center of political association, so as to effect some combina-
tion of dispossession, desecration, or disenfranchisement in ad-
dition to a taking of compensable wealth.
94
Shifting attention to the just compensation requirement may pro-
vide a means of retaining the rational basis test without fully sacri-
ficing private property rights. 95 Nevertheless, private property
owners would probably find little comfort in such protection. On
the one hand, if Tribe means that takings should be struck down
only where "no amount of money could compensate" the con-
demnee, it is likely that every condemnation would pass constitu-
tional muster. As the economist would argue, even the value of the
condemnees' interests in Poletown could be determined.96 If, on the
other hand, Tribe is referring to the actual price set in the condem-
nation proceeding, then it is likely that most condemnations would
have to be set aside, for otherwise the property would have sold on
the private market and not been subjected to involuntary
conversion.
97
93 Brief for Appellants, supra note 15, at 34.
94 Id.
95 One author suggests that the just compensation clause provides a "promising touch-
stone for substantive review of the noneconomic aspects of takings." Leading Cases of the
1983 Term, 98 HARV L. REV. 87, 234 (1984). Professor Michelman also acknowledges that
the just compensation clause is a "plausible candidate for the office of mediating device
between property and police power." Michelman, Property As A Constitutional Right, supra
note 84, at 1110. Nevertheless, he concludes:
It's such a nice idea; too bad it doesn't work. Alas, there are a number of
reasons why the device of compensating owners with money for governmental in-
cursions on their property cannot avoid occasions when either property or police
power must give way-and a choice, therefore, has to be made between two consti-
tutional principles which, it follows, cannot both be absolutes. The most obvious,
and least interesting, of these reasons is the sheer impracticability of providing
monetary compensation for all property value impairments caused by governmen-
tal action in pursuit of valid goals.
Id. at 1111.
96 This would be the amount of money the condemnees would be willing to accept in
exchange for their property in a market transaction.
97 A legislature ordinarily will resort to condemnation only where its attempts to
purchase the desired property have been rebuffed, i.e., where the owner has rejected the
government's offering price. When a legislature refuses to pay the asking price in a private
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To protect private property owners, then, the focus must re-
turn to an examination of the fundamental link between property
and liberty.98 Not every seizure of property will interfere with in-
terests essential to liberty, but, as the Poletown case reflects, liberty
interests may be irrevocably injured by the seizure of property.
Courts, therefore, should be empowered to look beyond whether a
particular taking is merely rationally related to a conceivable public
purpose.
In the wake of Midkif, at least two authors have proposed that
courts employ a balancing test to take into account the liberty inter-
ests of private property owners. 99 The application of this standard
would allow courts to measure the injury to the condemnee, the
interests of and alternatives available to the condemnor, and other
factors. Surely, the bare words of the Constitution's public use
clause do not call for such a balancing test. But, if courts were to
adhere to a literal reading of the Constitution, there would be no
need to seek alternative protection for the rights of private property
owners. 00
B. The Contracts Clause and Limitations on the Police Power
The contracts clause states that "[n]o State shall. . . pass...
any law impairing the Obligation of Contracts."'10 In many ways, it
is closely related to the fifth amendment's public use limitation.
First, like the public use limitation, the contracts clause provides a
blanket prohibition on government activity. Second, the two provi-
sions were designed to protect the private property interests of in-
dividuals, and both must be balanced with the police power. Third,
to the extent that contractual agreements constitute property inter-
ests, an impairment of contracts may constitute a taking of property
for fifth amendment purposes. 02 Similarly, contracts clause issues
transaction, it is not likely that it would offer the desired amount in a condemnation
proceeding.
98 See notes 84-85 supra. Oliver Wendell Holmes expressed the gist of this relationship
when, in a letter to W. James dated April 1, 1907, he stated: "The true explanation of the
law of prescription seems to me to be that man, like a tree in the cleft of a rock, gradually
shapes his roots to his surroundings, and when the roots have grown to a certain size, can't
be displaced without cutting his life." Reprinted in M. LERNER, THE MIND AND FArm OF
JUSTICE HOLMES 417 (1943), cited in Michelman, Property as a Constitutional Right, supra note
84, at 1112.
99 See generally Radin, supra note 85; Note, Public Use, Private Use, andJudicial Review in
Eminent Domain, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 409 (1983). See also Berger, supra note 10, at 235.
100 If courts required that takings actually be for a public use, private property owners
would realize adequate protection of their interests.
101 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
102 The definition of property for fifth amendment purposes is not limited to tangible
property. See note 103 infra. One author has argued that the results in contracts clause
cases "might be the same if the contract clause were dropped out of the Constitution, and
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may also arise in the context of government takings where the
property condemned is subject to contractual agreements.
10 3
Once employed regularly to invalidate conflicting legisla-
tion, 10 4 the contracts clause subsequently became subordinate to
the state's police power, or, more generally, to the government's
right to regulate economic behavior.1 0 5 Yet, in Allied Structural Steel
Co. v. Spannaus,10 6 the Supreme Court recently revived the contracts
clause as a specific and effective restriction on state power. 0 7 To
implement this restriction, the Court determined that government
interests must be balanced with the essential protections afforded
in the Constitution. 10 8 In terms of underlying policy, the Court's
reasoning in this context also provides support for reviving the
public use limitation as an effective limitation on government
power.
In Spannaus, the Supreme Court reviewed legislation which in-
creased the contractual obligations of companies under certain
pension plans.' 0 9 The Court, in striking down the legislation,
stated "[i]f the Contract Clause is to retain any meaning at all. . . it
must be understood to impose some limits upon the power of a State
to abridge existing contractual relationships, even in the exercise of
its otherwise legitimate police power."' 110 The Court held that the
standard of review is determined by the level of impairment of con-
tractual relationships:
The severity of the impairment measures the height of the hurdle the state
legislation must clear. Minimal alteration of contractual obliga-
tions may end the inquiry at its first stage. Severe impairment,
on the other hand, will push the inquiry to a careful examination
the challenged statutes all judged as reasonable or unreasonable deprivations of property."
Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause, 57 HARV. L. REv. 852, 890 (1944).
103 The Supreme Court has held that intangible property, such as contracts or charters,
is subject to condemnation under eminent domain. West River Bridge v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6
How.) 507 (1848), involved the state seizure of a bridge owned by a company incorporated
under a state charter. The Court acknowledged that the taking of the bridge necessarily
entailed the concomitant seizure of contract rights associated with the bridge and the char-
ter, but held that all property rights, whether tangible or otherwise, were subject to con-
demnation by the state. The Court reaffirmed Dix in Cincinnati v. Louisville & Nashville
R.R., 223 U.S. 390 (1912).
In Midkiff, the condemnee landowners argued that the Hawaii Land Reform Act vio-
lated not only the public use clause, but also the contracts clause. See Brief for Appellees at
85-89, Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. 2321 (1984).
104 "The Supreme Court from 1874-1898 used the clause in thirty-nine cases to invali-
date state legislation." J. NOWAK, supra note 63, at 466.
105 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), marked the Court's
retreat from an expansive reading of the contracts clause.
106 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
107 SeeJ. NOWAK, supra note 63, at 469.
108 See text accompanying note Ill infra.
109 438 U.S. at 238-39.
110 Id. at 242.
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of the nature and purpose of the state legislation.1"'
The Court stated that where a specific constitutional guarantee was
involved, the legislation must be narrowly tailored to promote a le-
gitimate state interest. 1
12
The test formulated in Spannaus has been followed in Energy
Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co. 1 13 In Energy Reserves,
the Supreme Court, quoting Spannaus, clarified that the threshold
inquiry was "whether the state law has, in fact, operated as a sub-
stantial impairment of a contractual relationship." ' 14 The Court af-
firmed that a substantial impairment calls for heightened
scrutiny. 115 Moreover, once the threshold inquiry is passed, the
state must show "a significant and legitimate public purpose behind
the regulation, . . . such as the remedying of a broad and general
social or economic problem."' 1 6 If the state meets this burden, the
court must finally determine whether the adjustments of "the rights
and responsibilities of the contracting parties [are based] upon rea-
sonable conditions and [are] of a character appropriate to the pub-
lic purpose justifying [the legislation's] adoption."" i7 Only on this
latter point, the Court stated, is deference properly granted to the
legislature."18
Thus, the Supreme Court has recognized limits to the police
power and has expressed a willingness to balance that power
against specific constitutional guarantees. Like contractual agree-
ments, private property interests in eminent domain are impaired
to a varying degree depending on the nature of the government's
action. Therefore, it seems appropriate that courts should have the
discretion to apply a corresponding measure of scrutiny where a
seizure of private property causes substantial injury."x9 The precise
111 Id. at 245 (emphasis added). The Court went on to say:
The severity of an impairment of contractual obligations can be measured by
the factors that reflect the high value the Framers placed on the protection of pri-
vate contracts. Contracts enable individuals to order their personal and business
affairs according to their particular needs and interests. Once arranged, those rights
and obligations are binding under the law, and the parties are entitled to rely on them.
Id. (emphasis added).
112 Id. at 250.
113 103 S. Ct. 697 (1983). This case involved an action by a natural gas supplier to
enforce a contractual termination clause. The Kansas Natural Gas Price Protection Act,
passed after the contracts were entered into, nullified the effect of the termination clause.
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 55-1401 to -1415 (1981).




118 Id. at 706. The Court ultimately determined that the legislation in question did not
violate the contracts clause.
119 Considering the potential threat to liberty interests posed by government takings,
the need for judicial flexibility is even more compelling in the eminent domain context.
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test in contracts clause cases does not fit well in the eminent do-
main context 20 but the general thrust of the Court's newly adopted
standard of review, that of heightened scrutiny, should be afforded
to the interests of private property owners made subject to the gov-
ernment's taking power.
III. Public Policy Analysis
The Framers of the Constitution designed the public use
clause to limit government power and, more specifically, to protect
the rights of private property owners in the possession of their
property.' 2 1 Such protection promotes security in property and, in
turn, secures investment backed expectations. To this extent the
public use clause encourages investment and economic growth. 122
At the same time, the clause reduces the inefficiencies which often
result from government takings.' 25 Notwithstanding these consid-
erations, legislatures often postulate that the exercise of eminent
domain power promotes economic efficiency and the proper func-
tioning of markets. 124 Because legislatures may be incorrect in as-
sessing the economic impact of policy measures, this legislative
exercise is often disconsonant with the underlying purposes of the
public use clause.
Characterized in this light, the divergent economic stances of
the Framers and legislatures are not amenable to judicial reconcilia-
tion. Judges are not public policy analysts and it is not the province
of the courts to determine whether the legislature has miscalculated
its economic findings. But courts need not conduct such an eco-
nomic inquiry to uphold the protections of the public use clause.
Rather, those protections, which secure both economic and liberty
interests, may be guarded simply by a more careful reading of the
public use clause itself; that is, by providing specific parameters to
the broadened meaning of that term and by applying close scrutiny
120 Private property owners would receive little additional protection by requiring, as in
Energy Reserves, that the state show evidence of a "significant and legitimate public pur-
pose." 103 S. Ct. at 704-05. For an alternative balancing test tailored to the eminent do-
main context, see Note, supra note 99.
121 The court of appeals in Midkiff provides an interesting discussion of the Framers'
intent in establishing the public use limitation. Midkiffv. Tom, 702 F.2d at 790-93. See also
Note, supra note 99, at 412-13.
122 One historian has characterized "security in one's property" as an "indispensible
condition of productive investment and the accumulation of wealth." D. LANDES, THE UN-
BOUND PROMETHEUS 16 (1980).
123 Indeed, Judge Posner maintains that the exercise of eminent domain power is justi-
fied in economic terms only in the context of certain holdout situations. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAw 41-42 (1977). See also Munch, An Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain, 84J.
POL. ECON. 473 (1976).
124 See text accompanying notes 126, 130 infra.
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to takings which impair essential liberty interests. 125
In Midkif, the state legislature explained the Hawaii Land Re-
form Act as a measure to correct market failure caused by the con-
centration of land ownership:
[T]he Hawaii Legislature discovered that while the State and
Federal Governments owned almost 49% of the State's land,
another 47% was in the hands of only 72 private landowners
... . The Legislature concluded that concentrated land own-
ership was responsible for skewing the State's residential fee
simple market, inflating land prices, and injuring public tran-
quility and welfare. 126
The Supreme Court refrained from making an independent policy
analysis of these findings, noting that "empirical debates over the
wisdom of takings . . . are not to be carried out in the federal
courts."' 27 Nevertheless, by accepting the legislature's determina-
tion that the Act satisfied the public use requirement, the Court af-
firmed the diluted reading of that concept. Without resorting to
public policy analysis, the Court could have upheld the economic
protection afforded by the takings clause by simply interpreting its
language more narrowly.' 28 The Hawaii Land Reform Act may in
fact have passed such a hurdle, for the special circumstances sur-
rounding Hawaii's land problem supported the government's
actions. 129
The Poletown taking probably would not pass a more narrow
reading of the public use clause. In that case, which involved the
seizure of property on behalf of General Motors, the City of Detroit
argued that the "controlling public purpose in taking this land is to
create an industrial site which will be used to alleviate and prevent
conditions of unemployment and fiscal distress."' 30 If general
claims regarding the reduction of unemployment satisfy the public
use requirement, then the concept has little meaning today. In-
deed, it is ironic that such specultive economic arguments would
prevail over a specific constitutional restriction which itself embod-
ies firm economic values.' 3'
One may well argue that the cumulative impact of government
125 See note 10 supra.
126 Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. at 2325.
127 Id. at 2330.
128 Even assuming that the Hawaii legislation could have passed a more narrow reading
of public use, that concept could have retained a measure of economic protection had the
court placed limits on its meaning.
129 Land ownership in Hawaii is unique among the 50 states. Had the Supreme Court
limited the Midkiff holding to the facts of the case, its decision would not have become
subject to the present critique.
130 Poklown, 410 Mich. at 632, 304 N.W.2d at 458. See notes 87-98 supra and accompany-
ing text.
131 See notes 121-23 supra and accompanying text.
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takings is to cause the destabilization of private property rights
through an increase in risk associated with property ownership.
13 2
To protect the rights of property owners and check the "fair
minded" goals of legislatures, courts should enforce that specific
clause of the Constitution which operates not only to protect prop-




The Supreme Court in Midkiff held that courts must defer to
legislative determinations as to what constitutes public use for fifth
amendment purposes. The decision straps courts to a rigid stan-
dard of review and almost ensures that all government takings will
be upheld. An examination of the potential abuse of the eminent
domain power and the little judicial protection offered to private
land owners under a deferential standard of review reflects the un-
reasonableness of such a holding.
Where property interests are meshed with fundamental liberty
interests, the need for judicial protection of those interests be-
comes particularly acute. Only if courts have the discretion to
closely scrutinize condemnations will individuals receive a proper
measure of protection. We should recall that the power of eminent
domain itself is not directly derived from the Constitution but is
implied as an attribute of sovereignty or a political necessity.13 4 To
imply a power in government, to give that power the broadest pos-
sible meaning, and then to defer to the exercise of that power in the
face of a specific constitutional restriction, effectively nullifies the
public use limitation and disregards those individual rights which
the fifth amendment was designed to protect.
135
Thomas J. Coyne
132 "Using the legislature to coerce transfer of private lands encourages bypassing pri-
vate markets in favor of political markets to decide what property should be transferred and
at what price." Epstein, Asleep at a Constitutional Switch, Wall St.J., Aug. 9, 1984, at 28, col.
3.
133 See notes 121-23 supra and accompanying text.
134 See note 1 supra.
135 Nor does the government discriminate in choosing the target of its takings, for both
the wealthy investor and the ordinary citizen suffer at its expense. This should cause
greater concern among ordinary citizens for, as one writer noted, "[plutting the rich and
poor on equal footing is giving the wealthy an amazing advantage." Whitlock, Pa. Evening
Post, May 22, 1777, cited in W. ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITuTrIONS 189 (1980).
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